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We characterize the statistical properties of a large number of agents on two major online auction sites. The
measurements indicate that the total number of bids placed in a single category and the number of distinct
auctions frequented by a given agent follow power-law distributions, implying that a few agents are responsible
for a significant fraction of the total bidding activity on the online market. We find that these agents exert an
un-proportional influence on the final price of the auctioned items. This domination of online auctions by an
unusually active minority may be a generic feature of all online mercantile processes.
PACS numbers: 89.75.-k, 89.75.Da.
Electronic commerce (E-commerce) is any type of business
or commercial transaction that involves information transfer
across the Internet. Over the past five years, E-commerce has
expanded rapidly, taking the advantage of faster, cheaper and
more convenient transactions over traditional ways. A syn-
ergetic combination of the Internet supported instantaneous
interactions and traditional auction mechanisms, online auc-
tions represent a rapidly expanding segment of E-commerce.
Indeed, with the advent of the Internet most limitations of tra-
ditional auctions, such as geographical and time constraints,
have virtually disappeared, making a significant fraction of
the population potential auction participants [1, 2]. For ex-
ample eBay, the largest consumer-to-consumer auction site,
boosts over 40 million registered consumers, and has grown
in revenue over 100,000 percent in the past five years. With
the rapidly increasing number of agents the role of individuals
diminishes and self-organizing processes increasingly dom-
inate the market’s behavior [3, 4]. On the other hand, re-
cently the self-organizing features of complex systems have
attracted the attention of the statistical physics community
because they contain diverse cooperations among numerous
components of a system, resulting in patterns and behavior
which are more than the sum of the individual action of the
components. While many systematic studies have been car-
ried out to understand such emerging patterns in various sys-
tems, little attention has been paid to electronic auctions. In
this Letter, we collect auction data and show that the bid-
ding of hundreds of thousands of agents leads to unexpected
emerging behavior, impacting on everything from the bidding
patterns of the participating agents to the final price of the auc-
tioned item. We found that the total number of bids placed in
a single category by a given agent follows a power-law distri-
bution. The power-law behavior is rooted in the finding that
an agent that makes frequent bids up to a certain moment is
more likely to bid in the next time interval. Moreover, we find
that the number of distinct items frequented by a given agent
also follows a power-law distribution. The power-law behav-
ior implies that a few powerful agents bid more frequently and
on more distinct items than others. We will show that such
powerful agents exert strong influence on the final prices in
distinct auctions.
To be specific, we collected auction data from two different
sources. First, we downloaded all auctions closing on a single
day on eBay, including 264,073 auctioned items, grouped by
the auction site in 194 subcategories. The dataset allowed us
to identify 384,058 distinct agents via their unique user ID. To
verify the validity of our findings in different markets and time
spans, we collected data over a one year period from eBay’s
Korean partner, auction.co.kr, involving 215,852 agents that
bid on 287,018 items in 62 subcategories.
In a typical online auction a seller places the item’s descrip-
tion on the auction site and sets the starting and the closing
time for the auction. Agents (bidders) submit bids for the
item. Each new bid has to exceed the last available bid by
a preset increment. Agents can bid manually, placing a fixed
bid, or on some auction sites (such as eBay but not on their
Korean partner) they can take advantage of proxy bidding. In
proxy bidding an agent indicates to the auction house the max-
imum price he/she is willing to pay for the given item (proxy
bid), which is not disclosed to other bidders. Each time a bid-
der increases the bid price, the auction house makes automatic
bids for the agent with an active proxy bid, outbidding the last
bid with a fixed increment, until the proxy price is reached.
In online consumer-to-consumer auctions the agent with the
highest bid wins and pays the amount of that bid; all other
participants pay nothing.
Most online auction sites keep a detailed, publicly avail-
able record of all bids and identify the bidding agents via an
unique login name. It is this transparency of the bidding his-
tory that allows us to characterize in quantitative terms the
auction process. Each completed auction can be character-
ized by two quantities: the number of distinct agents bidding
on the same item (nagent) and the total number of recorded
bids for the item (nbids), where nbids ≥ nagent, as each agent
can place multiple bids. In Fig. 1 we show the distribution of
nagent and nbids over all auctions recorded on eBay, finding
that they both follow P (n) ∼ exp(−n/n0), where n0 = 5.6
for nbids and n0 = 2.5 for nagent. We obtained similar re-
sults for the Korean market, with n0 = 10.8 for nbids and
n0 = 7.4 for nagent. This simple exponential form is unex-
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FIG. 1: Bid and agent distribution on eBay. (a) Distribution of num-
ber of agents (nagent ,(⋄)) simultaneously bidding on a certain item
and number of bids (nbids,(+)) received for an item, obtained by con-
sidering all items contained in the 194 categories on individual bids
that were collected from auctions ending on July 5, 2001 on eBay. (b)
and (c) Agent and bid distribution in the largest (b) and the second
largest (c) category on eBay. The largest category by the number of
auctioned items contains 21,461 items related to sport trading cards
while the second largest category includes 13,610 items related to
printed and recorded music. The straight lines correspond to expo-
nential fits and the symbols are the same as in (a).
pected, as one expects that the bidding distribution is the result
of many independent events, and therefore follows a Gaus-
sian, peaked around the average number of bids and decreas-
ing as ∼ exp(−an2) with a constant a. The deviation from
a Gaussian distribution could come from the fact that Fig. 1a
collapses data from different categories, displaying different
bidding patterns. In Fig. 1b and c we show the distribution in
two subcategories (sports trading cards and printed, recorded
music), finding that they follow the same functional form as
the aggregated data. Therefore, the exponential form for the
activity distribution appears to be a general feature of all auc-
tions, indicating that the majority of auctions have only a few
bidders and auctions with a large number of bids or participat-
ing agents are exponentially rare.
To characterize the activity of individual agents we deter-
mined the number of bids placed by each agent on each auc-
tion. As agents place simultaneous bids on items that closely
resemble each other, we denote by κbid the total number of
bids placed by the same agent in auctions in the same category.
For example, if several similar computers are sold on separate
auctions, agents looking for a computer often bid simultane-
ously for several or all of them. We find that the distribution
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FIG. 2: Frequency of bids placed by individual agents. (a) Cumula-
tive distribution of total number of bids, κbid, placed by a given agent
in auctions in the same category. For each of the 194 categories we
separately determined the cumulative distributions and averaged the
obtained curves. (b) Cumulative distribution of the number of dis-
tinct auctions, nauct, frequented by a given agent. The dotted line
on (a) has slope -2 while on (b) has slope -2.5, indicating that the
corresponding probability distribution follows P (κbid) ∼ κ−3bid and
P (nauct) ∼ n
−3.5
auct , respectively.
of κbid follows a power law
P (κbid) ∼ κ
−γ
bid, (1)
where γ = 3 (Fig. 2a) on both eBay and the Korean auction. A
similar power law characterizes the distribution of the number
of different auctions, nauct, frequented by individual agents,
finding that
P (nauct) ∼ n
−β
auct, (2)
where β = 3.5 (Fig. 2b). The power-law distribution shown
in Fig. 2a implies that while most agents place only a small
number of bids, a few agents bid very frequently, placing sev-
eral hundred bids on the same day. Similarly, Fig. 2b indicates
that while most agents participate in a few auctions only, a few
agents bid very widely, some placing simultaneous bids on
over a hundred distinct items on the same day. Therefore, un-
known to most participants, the auction process is dominated
by a small number of highly active agents, or power-agents,
that pursue a very aggressive bidding pattern, placing simul-
taneously a large number of bids on a wide range of items.
These power-agents are responsible for the power-law tail of
the distribution shown in Fig. 2. Our measurements indicate
that there is a strong correlation between the number of bids
3(a)
(d) (e)
(c)(b)
rank
rankrank
rank
n      =4agent
rank
n      =3agentn      =2
agent
agent
n      =5
3 40
0.2
0.4
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1 2 1 30
0.2
0.6
0.4
0.2
0 1 2 3 4 5
2
0.4
2
75301
0.2
0.4
0.6
1
FIG. 3: Frequent bidders more likely to win an auction. (a) The
probability that an auction is won by agents with given activity rank.
Using all completed auctions we calculated how many times the
most, the second, or the n-th frequent bidder wins the auction. (b)
The probability that the most frequent bidder wins the auction of
two participants. (c)-(e): the probability that an agent wins an auc-
tion of n [(c) n=3; (d) n=4; (e) n=5] participants. (a) is based on
143,325 auctions, while (b)-(e) are based on 47,610, 30,205, 20,017,
and 13,762 auctions, respectively.
placed by an agent on an item and the number of items the
same agent bids for, indicating that power agents simultane-
ously bid frequently and widely.
Agents with an aggressive bidding pattern significantly al-
ter the nature of the bidding process, potentially distorting the
chance of a typical agent to win an auction. To inspect the ef-
fect of the bidding pattern on the success rate of a given agent,
we determined the fraction of auctions won by the most, the
second, or the k-th most frequently bidding agents. We find
that in 61% of all auctions the winner is the agent that makes
the most bids, and in 29% of all auctions the second most fre-
quently bidding agent wins the auction (Fig. 3a). Less than
0.3% of the auctions are won by agents whose activity ranks
fifth or higher. As most auctions have only a few participating
agents (Fig. 1a), it is useful to re-examine the winning patterns
in auctions with the same number of agents. We find that if
only two agents participate in an auction, and each place mul-
tiple bids, in 85% of the cases the agent with more bids wins
the auction (Fig. 3b). The situation is similar for three agents
as well (Fig. 3c): in 64% of the cases the more active agent
wins, followed by the second most active, which wins in 32%
of the cases. In auctions with larger number of participants
(Fig. 3d-e) we observe a similar pattern. These results indi-
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FIG. 4: The dependence of an agents success rate on the number of
auctions the agent participates. For each product subcategory (con-
taining highly similar items) we calculated Pwini , the average of the
winning prices for items won by agent i. For the same agent we
also calculated P losti , the average over the winning price over items
in which agent i participated but lost. A successful agent can get a
lower price for the items it won than other agents bidding on similar
items on parallel auctions, i.e. for a successful agent Pwini < P losti .
We find that the success rate of an agent, measured as the function of
auctions won at a lower than average price (i.e. the fraction of agents
for which Pwini <P losti ) increases with the number of auctions these
agents participate in. A horizontal dotted line corresponds to the case
when there is no correlation between the frequency of bidding and
the chances of getting a better price. A numerical fitting indicates
that the success rate increases logarithmically (dashed line).
cate that frequently bidding agents play a key role in setting
the final price of most auctioned items: in the vast majority of
the cases the agents who place the largest number of bids are
the winners of the auction process. This finding indicates that
despite the widespread practice of sniping among experienced
users [5] when bidders place bids only in the last 60 seconds
of the auction hoping to win the auctioned item, on average
frequent bidders are more successful.
As the power law distribution (Fig. 2b) indicates that some
agents bid rather widely, the question is, does such wide bid-
ding result in economic advantage for power bidders? Our
results indicate that power agents not only are the frequent
winners of the auctions in which they participate, but they
also pay less than other agents on similar items. Indeed, in
Fig. 4 we show the fraction of times the most frequently bid-
ding agent pays less for an item than other agents that win
auction of items in the same category. We find that the more
auctions an agent participates, the larger is its chance to pay
less for the same item than the less widely bidding agents.
The observed power law distribution is rooted in the dy-
namics of the bidding process. Indeed, two processes con-
tribute to the final number of bids placed on a given item: new
agents entering the bidding process and agents that already
placed a bid increase their bid. We find that this pattern is
governed by a process often referred to as preferential attach-
ment, similar to those responsible for the emergence of scal-
ing in complex networks [6]: more bids an agent places on a
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FIG. 5: The origin of the observed power law is in preferential at-
tachment. The figure shows the change in the number of bids placed
by an agent i that previously placed k bids, averaged over all items
and all times. The linear behavior in the log-log plot indicates that
the more bids an agent places up to a given moment, the more likely
it is that it will place another bid in the next time interval. Such pref-
erential bidding is known to lead to a power law bidding distribution
[7,9]. The dotted line with slope 1 is shown for visual reference.
given item up to a certain moment, more likely is that he/she
will place an another bid in the future (Fig. 5). The linearity of
the observed relationship is known to lead to power law distri-
butions, as demonstrated by studies in both economics [7, 8]
and complex networks [9, 10, 11].
While power laws have been often observed in economic
contexts, ranging from city [8] and company size distribu-
tion [12, 13] to Pareto’s observation of wide income distri-
butions [14] and time series analysis [5], they are rather unex-
pected during the frequency of bidding of individual users.
In order to develop an analytical framework to capture the
dynamics of the bidding process current auction models in-
evitably make use of equilibrium concept [15, 16]. Often this
requires the assumption that the number of agents is fixed [15]
which, while leads to analytically tractable models, is not re-
alistic in the context of Internet auctions. Indeed, the power
laws observed here are the result of the auction’s fundamental
openness and non-equilibrium nature. In the past few years
the observation of such non-equilibrium features in economic
phenomena has led to an increased interest among physicists
and mathematicians in the self-organizing processes govern-
ing economic systems [3, 4, 12, 17, 18]. Our finding, that
similar non-equilibrium processes govern the behavior of on-
line auctions places these mercantile processes in the realm of
agent driven self-organization.
In conclusion, we have collected online auction data
and analyzed the statistical properties of emerging patterns
created by a large number of agents. We found that the total
number of bids placed in a single category and the number
of distinct auctions frequented by a given agent follow
power-law distributions. Such power-law behaviors imply
that the online auction system is driven by self-organized
processes, involving all agents participated in a given auction
activity. We also uncovered the empirical fact that the more
bids an agent places up to a given moment, more likely it is
that it will place another bid in the next time interval, which
plays an important role in generating the power-law behavior
in the bidding frequency distribution by a given agent.
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